My two previous posts in this series examined the tidbits that can be gleaned from the UK and Chinese cases in the ZTE/Samsung dispute, Courts That "FRAND" Differently: Part 1, and the first set of lessons that can and should be learned from them with a focus on structural problems (lessons 1-4), Courts that “FRAND” Differently Part 2: Lessons To Be Learned. This post also focuses on lessons that can and should be learned from the cases with a focus on FRAND licenses and “com

I ended my last post with the following quote from the UK Court in Samsung v. ZTE: “this profusion of litigation is a symptom of a dysfunctional system . . .”[1] In response to the ever increasing problem of too much litigation and to these internecine jurisdictional fights, several entities and government organizations have formed “working groups” to review and evaluate how to make FRAND determinations outside the court system. The World Intellectual Property Organization

I recently posted about how two different courts –the High Court of England and Wales (“UK Court”) and China’s Chongqing Intermediate People’s Court (“Chinese Court”) – reached vastly different conclusions on the value of a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) portfolio cross-license for the same set of cellular SEP portfolios.[1] I originally wanted to title this series “Courts That Can’t Math.” I changed the title, however, to Courts That "FRAND" Differently b