SEP Essentials

My two previous posts in this series examined the tidbits that can be gleaned from the UK and Chinese cases in the ZTE/Samsung dispute, Courts That "FRAND" Differently: Part 1, and the first set of lessons that can and should be learned from them with a focus on structural problems (lessons 1-4), Courts that “FRAND” Differently Part 2: Lessons To Be Learned. This post also focuses on lessons that can and should be learned from the cases with a focus on FRAND licenses and “com

I ended my last post with the following quote from the UK Court in Samsung v. ZTE: “this profusion of litigation is a symptom of a dysfunctional system . . .”[1] In response to the ever increasing problem of too much litigation and to these internecine jurisdictional fights, several entities and government organizations have formed “working groups” to review and evaluate how to make FRAND determinations outside the court system. The World Intellectual Property Organization

I recently posted about how two different courts –the High Court of England and Wales (“UK Court”) and China’s Chongqing Intermediate People’s Court (“Chinese Court”) – reached vastly different conclusions on the value of a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) portfolio cross-license for the same set of cellular SEP portfolios.[1] I originally wanted to title this series “Courts That Can’t Math.” I changed the title, however, to Courts That "FRAND" Differently b

Recently, two different courts — the High Court of England and Wales (“UK Court”) and China’s Chongqing Intermediate People’s Court (“Chinese Court”) — opined on what a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) portfolio cross-license would be for the very same 5G cellular SEP portfolios.[1] They came to significantly different results: the UK Court decided the balancing payment from Samsung to ZTE should be about $392 million whereas the Chinese Court decided it should

Several years ago, the European Union filed an action against China in the World Trade Organization alleging that China’s use of anti-suit injunctions (“ASIs”) in standard essential patent (“SEP”) cases violated the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) (see https://www.sepessentials.com/post/the-eu-complaint-against-china-update and https://www.sepessentials.com/post/first-pop-quiz-revisited-the-eu-complaint-against-china). I

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) recently released its 2026 Special 301 Report on “the adequacy and effectiveness of U.S. trading partners’ protection and enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights.”[1] You can find the 2026 Report here: 2026 Special 301 Report.pdf ("Report"). Amongst the typical sections on counterfeiting, piracy and copying, there is a new section in the 2026 Report focused on standards.[2] Let me start with wha

I recently attended the IPBC/IAM Live conference in Paris, where judges from both the Unified Patent Court (UPC) and a German court shared their perspectives on standard-essential patent (SEP) litigation. A consistent theme emerged from these discussions: neither the UPC nor Germany is equipped to make real FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) determinations. Florence Butin, President of the Court of First Instance of the UPC and herself a UPC judge, noted that th

One of the excuses used by Germany’s Federal Court of Justice in the VoiceAgeEVS v. HMD case to justify an injunction was its finding that injunctions are necessary to encourage implementers to take a license. But SEP licensing is not a goal of standard development . Let me say that again – SEP licensing is not a goal of standard development. SEP licensing by those who participate in the development of a standard is tolerated only because it is believed to support one

The European Commission (“EC”) Study focused on European Courts’ “inconsistency” in the application of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (“IPRED”) and advocated a “wait and see” “soft law” approach to solving the problem. See, "Inconsistency" - Europe Dithers Some More ). But, this “inconsistency” is not a failure to understand how to apply the IPRED properly but a willful refusal to follow it based on German and German-influenced Unified Pate

You can find my first post on the “Follow-up study on the application of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights” (“ EC Study ”) here: "Inconsistency" - Europe Dithers Some More . I wanted to take another look at the EC Study since there is so much to unpack in its 132 pages (not to mention the multiple attachments). This post focuses on patent assertion entities (PAEs) and their relationship to other identified problems. The EC Study defines PAEs

The European Commission just released its “Follow-up study on the application of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights” (which you can find here: EC Study ) (“EC Study”). The Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (“IPRED”) “established a framework of measures, procedures, and remedies for the civil enforcement of IP rights”. Among other reforms, it was intended to bring proportionality and balance to the conside

Since I have been so focused of late on Huawei’s conduct in the IEEE, I noticed two recent Huawei deals. They have been treated as unrelated, but I wonder whether they are, in fact, part and parcel of Huawei’s SEP strategy. Hence my title: pirates on the move. 1. Nokia acquires Wi-Fi 7 related patents from Huawei . Buried in an announcement from Nokia that was posted on December 11, 2025 ( New Wi-Fi licensing deals in automotive | Nokia ) is this statement: “In additio

2026 already has been a whirlwind of global activity, including in the world of standards and standard essential patents (SEPs). The United States has announced its intent “to win the global race for 6G” and obtain “scientific and technological global dominance” ( Global Dominance – The U.S.A.’s Views on Standards and SEPs ). China has further cemented its status as the only country in the world with a well-formulated and consistent strategy and vision around standards and S

On 27 April 2023, the European Commission published its proposal for the Regulation of Standard Essential Patents (“SEP Proposal”). The SEP Proposal was carefully considered and vetted through the European Union’s ordinary legislative procedures. Stakeholders and the public were given the opportunity to provide written input and there were more than 70 submissions from businesses, academics and other experts. It was also reviewed, and comments and suggestions made, by seve

The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”) requires each SEP owner to agree to give an “irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and conditions . . .” If a SEP owner refuses, the committee, in consultation with the ETSI Secretariat, is empowered to stop work on the applicable section of the standard. [1] Similarly, in the Institute of Electrical and Elec

Way back in the early days of this blog, I wrote an article about the EU’s complaint in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) against China ( First Pop Quiz Revisited - The EU Complaint Against China ). The EU complaint alleged that China violated the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights “TRIPS” agreement primarily through Chinese courts’ use of anti-suit injunctions. I wanted to give an update on that case: it appears that the EU has lost. Although a publi

I wanted to revisit the statements made by Qualcomm and Nokia representatives at the Global Standards Leadership Conference about aggregate cellular license amounts. See my post Global Standards Leadership Conference - Part 3 ( sepessentials.com ) for additional details on what was said during the panel. To set the stage, according to a report put out last year by IPLytics, one of the hosts of the conference, Qualcomm is ranked no. 2 (behind only Huawei) and Nokia no. 5 in

I have previously posted in depth on the EU’s “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standard essential patents and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001” (“Proposal”) and recently gave an update on the passage by the EC’s Legal Affairs Committee (“JURI”) of a modified version of the Proposal. [1] I wanted to take a deeper dive into the modifications to the Proposal (“MP”) considered by JURI. [2] I’ll start by focusing on those aspects of

I have previously posted in depth on the EU’s “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standard essential patents and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001” (“Proposal”). [1] I am pleased to report that, on Wednesday (23/1/24 since we’re being European), the EC’s Legal Affairs Committee (“JURI”) adopted a modified version of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standard essential patents and amending

There was a point to the first pop quiz. Last year, the European Union filed a complaint in the World Trade Organization against China related to SEP litigation. In its First Written Submission (filed on June 8, 2023), the EU argues that the Chinese courts’ global FRAND setting and anti-suit injunctions violate the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights “TRIPS” agreement. [1] The EU brief argues that the Chinese courts’ decisions to set global FRAND rates and